1991) is considered by many the conclusive statement on religion of the Durkheimian school. In fact, this is rather a simplification of a more complicated intellectual history. A more careful evaluation of the examinations of religious phenomena by the members of the Durkheimian team demonstrates some intriguing theoretical distinctions that give rise to broader differences in intellectual position-taking and help explain serious differences in the trajectory of influence of the Durkheimian school on subsequent generations of intellectuals. These differences stem largely from the description of the nature of the sacred in the Durkheimian tradition.
Renegade Durkheimianism interdictions, and positive rites, which are the actual practices that bring the worshipper into contact with the sacred and are ultimately at the heart of religious ritual since only they contain their reason for existence in themselves (Durkheim 1991: 509--11, 551) . It is the positive rites, the most important historical example of which is the institution of sacrifice, that provide the setting for the most essential element of religious phenomena, according to Durkheim. This is the sentiment of collective effervescence that is generated in those moments of ritual worship of the sacred. But which form of the sacred, pure or impure, is enacted by positive rites? The answer would seem to be straightforward: it must be the pure sacred, as this is the life-celebrating and beneficent force. Durkheim certainly suggests that this must be the case:
Thus far from being ignorant of actual society and making a false abstraction of it, religion is the image of society; it reflects society in all its aspects, even the most vulgar and repulsive. Everything is found here and if, most often, it is the case that good is superior to evil, life superior to death, the forces of light superior to the forces of darkness, it is because reality is not otherwise. For if the relationship between these contradictory forces were reversed, life would be impossible. (Durkheim 1991: 700) However, there is a clear distinction in the manner in which the notion is theorized by Durkheim, on the one hand, and by his three closest colleagues who also worked on religious topics, on the other. This distinction has to do with rather different emphases with respect to Robertson Smith's distinction between the pure and the impure sacred. In Durkheim, the emphasis is on the pure sacred, the sacred as positive rite and negative interdiction, i.e., the sacred as the moral. Though he acknowledges the impure sacred and the ambiguity of its Renegade Durkheimianism relationship to the pure sacred, his concentration, both in his chef-d'oeuvre on religion and in his practical discussions of the role of the sacred in contemporary secular France, is clearly on the latter. In fact, a very difficult question concerning the origin of the impure sacred emerges from Durkheim's argument. The sacred is ultimately generated by the social itself, he argues, as a means for its constant reinvigoration. But why should society create a force, the impure sacred, that bodes ill for it, even threatens it with destruction? No clear answer suggests itself from Durkheim's analysis (Pickering 1984: 129; Arppe 1995: 214) .
The real Durkheimian engagement with the left or impure sacred took place not in the
Elementary Forms or in any other work of Durkheim himself, but rather in the work of his protégés Marcel Mauss, Henri Hubert and Robert Hertz. The more or less simple reduction in Durkheim of the sacred to the social as moral bond is more problematic in the work of his protégés. There is a concerted effort on the part of the three junior colleagues, in contrast to Durkheim, to attend to "the accursed part of the sacred," to acknowledge in its full theoretical and practical complexity this notion that is at the same time the foundational principle of the system and a part of the system that needs explanation.
[For] As a synonym for communal force, it is the condition of possibility of social symbols; thus, its meaning cannot be exhausted in its own symbolic representation. (Arppe 1995: 210) It is this attention to "the problem of evil" in the social that ultimately separates the two treatments of the sacred and of the social more generally. What precisely is the role played by the impure sacred in the generative processes of collective effervescence and revitalization that Riley 6 Renegade Durkheimianism are so important in the Durkheimian sociology of religion? Clearly, some part of this sensitivity to the "other half" of the sacred in the trio Mauss/ Hubert/ Hertz comes from their great immersion as students in Indian religious history and structure, as there is a much greater treatment of these themes here than in the greater (Judeo-Christian) and lesser (i.e., primitive)
religious traditions known better to Durkheim. Indeed, the groups that have emphasized aspects of the impure sacred in Brahmanic religion and its historical descendents have played a considerably larger role in the development of their religious systems than have analogous groups in Judaism and Christianity. For example, Gnosticism in Christianity and Tantricism in Hinduism and Buddhism each developed notions of the religious adept who, having reached a certain stage of spiritual development or relationship with the deity, was at least in certain cases no longer bound by particular moral strictures and could often increase his spiritual understanding by deliberately transgressing moral rules. Tantra however has played a significant role in historical Hinduism and Buddhism, while the historically emergent emphasis on the pure sacred in Christianity led to the total crushing of Gnosticism in the first centuries of the Church's establishment.
The distinction is however something deeper than just a difference of empirical area of specialization. As Pickering has noted, Durkheim extends the sacred/profane opposition in such a way as to link to the former collective representations, the realm of the ideal in general, and the collectivity or society, while the profane encompasses individual representations, the corporal or material realm, and the individual (Pickering 1984: 120 This idea is perhaps more general than that of the sacred. Since then, Durkheim has tried to deduct it logically from the notion of the sacred. We were never sure he was right, and I continue still to speak of the magico-religious base. (Mauss 1979: 218) While Durkheim indicated a distinction between, on the one hand, the series church/pure sacred/collective well-being and that of magic/impure sacred/collective ill-being, he left the latter largely unexplored, while Mauss and Hubert theorized it in much greater detail. In his introduction to the French translation of Chantepie de la Saussaye's Manuel d'histoire des religions, Hubert (1904) presents a qualified but vigorous criticism of Durkheim's theory of religion and the sacred, aiming at Durkheim's concentration on religious facts attached to a Church and to the pure sacred exclusively. He criticizes the Durkheimian emphasis on "the formation of doctrines and churches," as this is a reduction of "the total history of the religious life," which must include religious practice in societies without established churches or fixed systems of belief (Hubert 1904: xxii) . 2 Hubert was quite concerned that the history of religion not be reduced to the history of "church religions" (e.g., Christianity, Buddhism, Islam) to the exclusion of "religions of the people" (e.g., Roman, Greek and Assyrian religion) (1904: xxi).
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He also uses a telling comparison in indicating the mutual participation of magic and religion in a greater whole for which the social study of religious phenomena must account: Durkheim had of course discussed the sociological necessity of crime in his Rules of Sociological Method, demonstrating its importance for an understanding of the phenomenon of normal societies and moral action, but stopping well short of considering it an equal participant in a "more general class" with legal, moral action. Hubert's intent here is, as in the argument in the essay co-written with Mauss on magic, to emphasize the sociological illegitimacy of favoring religion over magic, or the pure over the impure sacred, simply because of an a priori moral project. Further on, Hubert (1904: xlvi--xlvii) is still more explicit that the notion of the sacred "appears under two different aspects, depending on whether we consider it in magic or in religion." In the latter case, the sacred takes on the face of interdictions and taboos; in the former, it is "willful sacrilege."
The later work of Mauss too was in many ways an elaboration of these early insights that distinguished the Hubert-Mauss model from that of Durkheim. This can be seen perhaps most clearly in Mauss's work on the notion of the gift. In his endeavor to establish the social fact of reciprocal gift-giving as a "total social fact," as a phenomenon that reveals the dense intertwining of social realms as diverse as the juridical, economic, religious and aesthetic, which even "in certain cases involve[s] the totality of society and its institutions, " (1950: 204, 274) Riley 9 Renegade Durkheimianism
Mauss borrows a Maori term, hau (or "spirit of things"), to attempt to define the power gift objects have to compel givers and receivers to "give, receive, render" (1950: 205) . As Lévi-Strauss notes disapprovingly in his preface to the volume in which Mauss's essay was reprinted, 4 Mauss uses the notion of hau here in much the same way the notion of mana had been used in the earlier essay on magic. Mauss quotes a Maori sage, Tamati Ranaipiri, to demonstrate the nature of the spiritual power inherent in the given object itself that provides a "moral and religious reason" (Mauss 1950: 153) for the imperative to give, receive and render the same, which he then summarizes as follows:
It is clear that in Maori law, the legal bond, the bond by things, is a bond of souls, for the thing itself has a soul. From which it follows that to present something to someone is to present something to oneself... [F] rejects as simply anti-scientific the untidy "notions of sentiment, of fatality, of chance and the arbitrary" that Mauss invokes (Lévi-Strauss 1950: xlv). Mauss's "error" then, here as in the case of mana, is to refuse to reduce either the motive power behind the obligation to give and receive gifts or the power behind magical efficacy and belief to some ultimately structuralist social necessity for order, be it logical or moral (in Lévi-Strauss's criticism, it is primarily the former; in Durkheim's theory of the sacred, it is the latter). In fact, in both cases, Mauss's intention is explicitly inclusive (1950: 164--9); 7 he refuses to consider as fundamental to the explanation of religious phenomena a concept that includes only those ideas and practices that are at bottom moral, or logically essential to the productive order of the social system, and that exclude ideas and practices that elude the moral categories and can even be destructive of social order. For Mauss, this inclusivity is necessary in the case of magic, in order to account for its deliberately anti-moral elements and, in the case of gift-giving, in order to account for agonistic gift-giving, such as that exemplified in the Kwakiutl potlatch, which is, far from the sort of non-agonistic gift-return cycle evident elsewhere (the kind perhaps more amenable to explanation by Lévi-Strauss), rather a form of virtual warfare (Mauss 1950: 269--70) .
Nearly the entirety of Hertz's published work deals extensively with the pure/impure sacred distinction, but nothing does so more clearly than his essay on social rituals surrounding The corpse itself moves through two classificatory stages during this process, beginning as an impure sacred object and becoming pure sacred with the final burial rites. Hertz has been read here and in his other work as using the sacred/profane dichotomy as a simple equivalent of the pure/impure sacred one (see Evans-Pritchard 1960; Parkin 1996) , and indeed he does explicitly note "a natural affinity and almost an equivalence between the profane and the impure" in his article on religious symbolism and the preference for the right hand (Hertz 1960: 95 ). Yet the language he uses in both these essays and particularly in the essay on death indicates clearly that he is discussing the distinction between impure and pure sacred statuses. The newly deceased is an object of "horror and dread," his relatives "impure and accursed" during the time they are denied normal membership in the society prior to the final burial ceremony (Hertz 1960: 37, 50) . More, it is clear he is talking about the impure sacred and not the profane if we follow Durkheim's formula for equating the latter with the non-social, as all of the aspects of the deceased and his relatives discussed are thoroughly social in their effects and remedies. In the final analysis, Hertz's work uncovers the myriad ways in which the impure sacred emerges within the social bond, creating liminal spaces through which social actors move and exerting a power that is ultimately generative at the core of the social bond.
The theoretical importance of the left/impure sacred for understanding the Durkheimian project and its legacy is significant. Indeed, the notion of the impure sacred raises the question of how to account for the concept of evil within the discourse of sociological theory. Durkheim reconciles himself to the existence of the impure sacred by placing it in a clearly inferior position an emphasis on the impure sacred tends to lead to an intellectual politics that is more based in emotional force (collective effervescence in pure form) and transgression, wherein the line separating scientific knowledge and politics is significantly less clear and the existential situation of the theorist takes on a great deal more importance.
Allan Stoekl (1992) has suggested (by way of Roland Barthes) that the modern French intellectual can be best understood as caught between two oppositional categories, the "writer"
and the "author;" the first is concerned with representation and communication via argumentation of a rational tenor, while the second is engaged in "the not necessarily rational
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Renegade Durkheimianism force of writing or language itself" (Stoekl 1992: 7) . In these two forms, the French intellectual has taken up the seemingly contradictory political tasks of acting both as representative and theoretician of the state and as critical dissident, and the stylistic and political conflict in these two models of intellectual identity is at the heart of the French situation. Durkheim, according to Stoekl's argument, occupies a foundational place in this narrative, as he was the first modern French intellectual to clearly pose the opposition in its essential form, which is in fact concerned with the intellectual's relation to the sacred. In Durkheim's treatment of the totem as at once "(re)instituting act and . . . representation" (Stoekl 1992: 8) , that is, as both rational and prerational expression of the social bond, he is laying down the terms of the task of the twentiethcentury French intellectuals who followed him: namely, the struggle to reconcile the two within The group attracted a wild and sometimes dark reputation for its interest in the extreme faces of such collective effervescence and experience of the sacred. There was even a rumor circulating among some of those close to the group that they intended at one point to carry out a human sacrifice, using a member of the group (Bataille himself perhaps, or his lover and fellow traveler
Colette Peignot who was already ill with the tuberculosis that would end her life in November 1938), in order to reenact the foundational myth necessary to make of the sacrificed a "founderhero" and of the group a new religion. This rumor remained only a rumor (see Felgine 1994: 139--40).
The Collège was, in some ways, an extension of Acéphale, an application of the same principles of intellectual action to an expanded and more public arena. The express goal of the Collège was the creation of a sacred sociology, which was defined as an enterprise that would Mauss's discussion of the gift was essential to Bataille's conception, and he tied his understanding of gift-giving and expenditure even more explicitly to the sacred.
For Bataille, the crucial moments in social life are those in which society expresses itself by ritual offering or destruction of la part maudite, the accursed share, in the moments that produce effervescence and power through a total and excessive expenditure of energy, even to the point of death. Sacrifice, war, potlatch, games, festivals, mystical fervor and possession, sexual orgies and perversions are all modes in which this kind of expenditure is carried out. This is obviously a discussion that turns traditional sociological and philosophical treatments of production and society, which take production as primary and expenditure as dependent upon it, on their heads. Bataille was among the group who attended, in the 1930s, the lectures at the took great pains to demonstrate "the unreasonable origins of reason" (Descombes 1980: 14) , Bataille took as basic the desire of man that, like animal desire, can be satiated only in destruction, in action that radically annihilates the object desired. He also followed Kojève in the conception of the philosopher's ultimate concern as not simply the world or society but as necessarily himself and his own experience prior to everything else. In other discussions of eroticism, violence and death, he echoes this point. The transgressive moment, he argues, "does not deny the taboo but transcends it and completes it" (Bataille 1986: 63) ; that is, an understanding of the sacred in purely right sacred terms overlooks the very necessity of the left sacred for the completion of the sacred experience. In
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Bataille's view, the sacred is the experience of "the greatest anguish, the anguish in the face of death . . . in order to transcend it beyond death and ruination" (Bataille 1986: 87) , and this experience is possible only when taboos and restrictions representing protection from things and realms that can produce death are transgressed. Thus, sexual taboos are burst asunder and the participants experience the transcendent moment in which the fear of death and decay that is intimately entwined in the sexual act (for "in the long or short run, reproduction demands the death of the parents who produced their young only to give fuller rein to the forces of annihilation" (Bataille 1986: 61) ) is overcome, however briefly. Similarly, Bataille sees as the primary element in sacrifice not the offering to the god but rather the transgression, in a violent act of collective murder, of death taboos in the interest of thereby experiencing collectively the effervescent moment in which all perceive "the continuity of all existence with which the victim is now one" (Bataille 1986: 22) .
In all this, Bataille takes as given the Durkheimian starting point of the sociality of the sacred and of effervescence, but he adds the compelling response of existentialism, which is that such phenomena cannot be studied from afar by the philosopher or sociologist but that they fundamentally implicate and involve him/her. He makes very clear the point that Mauss, Hubert, and Hertz suggested in their own projects, which is that the problem of the sacred is first and foremost a personal problem and that any scientific treatment of it cannot escape this fact. and later publishing a thesis on "Les Démons de midi" (Fournier 1994: 708) . But his connection to a certain unorthodox Durkheimianism extended further back even than these studies; while a lycée student in Reims in the early 1920s, one of his philosophy professors was none other than Marcel Déat, the renegade L'Année sociologique collaborator and friend of Célestin Bouglé who turned to the radical right and French national socialism in the 1930s (Felgine 1994: 31) .
Caillois wrote several book-length studies on precisely the central themes explored by the Durkheimian religion group. Le myth et l'homme (1938) and L'homme et le sacré (1939) were evidently greatly indebted to Mauss and to Durkheim, and also to Marcel Granet and George Dumézil. Though Mauss made some stern criticisms of the work on myth, finding the discussion of literature as modern myth too mired in "irrationalism" and "a vague sentimentality" (Mauss letter to Callois 1938) , it cannot be denied that Caillois's position on the foundational character that mythical thought has for social knowledge generally is fundamentally Durkheimian.
The book on the sacred is still more obviously Durkheimian, or more precisely Maussian, in spirit, with a great number of references to the work of the religion cluster. In many ways, it reads something like the "textbook" on the sacred that Mauss himself was the best suited to write but never did (see Felgine 1994: 205--6) . It also clearly shows the progression in the emphasis given to the "sacred as transgression," that is, the impure sacred, as opposed to the sacred as respect that we noted in Mauss, Hubert and Hertz. Caillois included as well a discussion of sexuality and the sacred that presaged Bataille's later work on eroticism as one of the central fields in which the impure sacred manifests itself.
Leiris's most important contribution to the Collège in substantive terms was a paper on "Le Sacré dans la vie quotidienne" that he delivered in January 1938. In this paper, he Riley 23 Renegade Durkheimianism demonstrated a concern for the sacred that was perhaps still more reflexive than even that of his comrades in the Collège. Leiris made completely explicit the connection between the ethnographer's concern with the sacred and his/her own participation in it by engaging in an analysis of the construction of the sacred in his own childhood and the ways in which that sacred structure lived on in his adult life. We find in Leiris's personal geography of the sacred the same distinction between left and right, impure and pure sacred, or in Caillois's terms, sacred of transgression and sacred of respect; his father's top hat and revolver are examples of the latter, the bathroom and a nearby race course exemplify the former (Leiris 1988: 24--31) .
The brevity of this central contribution to the Collège should not deceive us, for the recent publication of Leiris's notebooks in preparation for the subject demonstrate a deep and lasting concern for the subject of the sacred (Leiris 1994) . More, as is the case with Bataille and Caillois, much of his work beyond the explicit connection to the Collège was also engaged with the sacred as an object of central existential importance in his own life. He continued the autobiographical investigation of the sacred he had begun in the Collège after its collapse with a work in 1939 dedicated to Bataille (L'Age d'homme) , and then a series of books that comprise his masterwork, La Règle du jeu. In these works, the connection between the Durkheimian concern with the sacred and the ethnographic project, on the one hand, and the surrealist concern with literature as a profound form of self-examination, on the other, is explored in depth. In the detailed exploration of his own sacred landscape via examination of dreams, childhood memories and transgressive or limit experiences of debauchery, he hoped to create a true littérature engagée, in which the writer becomes l'homme total, "one for whom real and imaginary are one and the same" (Boyer 1974: 10) Michel Foucault was perhaps the most important of these later thinkers in pursuit of the impure sacred. The sacred was an important conceptual theme for Foucault in much of his work. He had an abiding interest in the work of Bataille, 13 which he described as producing a space in which "transgression prescribes not only the sole manner of discovering the sacred in its unmediated substance, but also a way of recomposing its empty form, its absence, through which it becomes all the more scintillating" (Foucault 1977: 30) . He argued that sexuality and other subjects he explored in his work (e.g., madness and death) become tied up with the Nietzschean death of God and the very possibility of the emergence of literature itself in so far as they constitute experiences that defy language to speak of them and that are nonetheless On the day that sexuality began to speak and to be spoken, language no longer served as a veil for the infinite; and in the thickness it acquired on that day, we now experience the absence of God, our death, limits, and their transgression. But perhaps it is also a source of light for those who have liberated their thought from all forms of dialectical language, as it became for Bataille, on more than one occasion, when he experienced the loss of his language in the dead of night. (Foucault 1977: 51) If the sacred is for Bataille desecrated and simultaneously remade in excessive festivals of orgiastic violence and sexuality, for Foucault it is in the act of writing itself that the connection to the sacred as transgression is created and maintained.
In his history of madness and the birth of the asylum in western Europe, Foucault argues that it is the confusion of madness with "unreason" (déraison ) that threatens to completely eliminate the possibility of perhaps our last remaining access to the sacred through the experience of the "mad" work of art (Foucault 1973: 288) . "Unreason" is seen as a realm of knowledge that offers insights not provided by other kinds of knowledge, and scientific knowledge, far from providing any possibilities for social rejuvenation, is described as actively responsible in its psychological guises for the misrecognition and subsequent destruction of this knowledge. This engagement with the left or transgressive sacred as a radical form of knowledge and experience of the social was not merely a fleeting phenomenon for Foucault. In
The Order of Things (1970) , he discusses the possibility of the death of Man as a mutation in lurks in the borderland between the moral and transgressive and "establishes the ambiguity of the lawful and the unlawful" through his/her words and deeds (Foucault et al 1975: 206) . He argues that the aesthetic experience that constitutes an encounter with the left sacred might go beyond the creation of a work of art to include even acts considered by a horrified citizenry vile and criminal, like those of Pierre Rivière, the young man in provincial France who murdered several members of his own family in the 1830s and subsequently wrote in a mémoir of the otherworldly imperatives that compelled him to do so. Later still, in his work on normalization and discipline (see, for example, Foucault 1978; , he examined specific contemporary western social spaces in which contact with the sacred is increasingly structurally denied. Again scientific discourses are seen as responsible for creating as categories of deviance certain realms of knowledge and practice (e.g., deviant sexualities) that for Foucault offer potential possibilities for transgressive knowledges and "pleasures" (Foucault 1978: 157) . Political regimes of both Evidence of influence from Durkheimian roots that point to a particular mobilization of the left or impure sacred can also be seen in the work of Jacques Derrida. A connection to
Mauss is directly observable, as Derrida has written a long essay devoted in large part to a commentary on Mauss's essay on the gift (Derrida 1991) . But beyond this, we can locate in his overall philosophical project clear connections to the later Durkheimian interest in the impure sacred. At the core of Derrida's work is a preoccupation with the aspect of western metaphysics that requires certain foundational binary categories that are actually undone by certain crucial concepts that can invoke both poles of a contradictory binary and that demonstrate the ultimate instability of seemingly firmly constructed philosophical systems of reasoning. He has examined in great detail the role played in foundational texts and writers of the western philosophical tradition by these unstable concepts and categories in order to unveil the holes in binary thought generally that they represent, and to criticize what he sees as a systematic classification of writing as somehow more radically separated from real metaphysical presence than is speech (see especially Derrida 1976; 1982: 1--27) . Examples are the word pharmakon (which can mean both "poison" and "remedy") in Plato (Derrida 1981) , supplément (which, Derrida argued, means both "addition to" and "replacement of," with reference to writing's relationship to speech) in Rousseau (Derrida 1976: 141--64) and gift (which, as Mauss (1969: 46) himself had pointed out, descends from a Germanic root that has Riley 29 Renegade Durkheimianism the dual meaning of "offering" and "poison," the former preserved in modern English "gift," the latter in modern German "gift").
Derrida's therapeutic project was to offer a new, radical kind of thought and writing that undoes this rigidity precisely by refusing the binary categories, exposing their limitations and reveling in transgression of the hierarchical rules of traditional thought. His own method of deconstruction aims to do precisely this, and in several works he has noted the efforts of others he sees as exemplary in this regard. In a reading similar to that of Foucault, Derrida (1978: 266) sees in Bataille's work a radical effort at "a sovereign form of writing" that embraces "the poetic or the ecstatic," which is defined by Bataille as "that in every discourse which can open itself up to the absolute loss of its sense, to the (non-) base of the sacred, of nonmeaning" (Derrida 1978 : 261, emphasis in original). Derrida interpreted the "theater of cruelty" of Artaud, which excluded from its ranks "all non-sacred theater," as analogous to his own efforts (Derrida 1978: 243) . Jean-Michel Heimonet (1987) with a rational will and a teleological place in history. It is the historical notion of the "the masses" or the "social" as a foundational tenet of the discipline of sociology that he argued has denied the validity of the experience of surplus, sacrifice and the sacred (Baudrillard 1983: 79) .
Sociology, in Baudrillard's reading, has always understood society as a utilitarian network of relations with use value as the driving force behind it. This understanding has led to the classification of the "masses" as alienated or mystified in so far as they forsake rational communication and commerce. But he argued it is precisely in spectacle 14 and in revelry in apparent meaninglessness that the sacred is experienced by the silent majorities. The "masses" explode the Enlightenment vision of the social completely in refusing "progressive" political mobilization for the modern festival of a soccer match (Baudrillard 1983: 12) . These festivals are in some sense the contemporary equivalent of Mauss's agonistic potlatch and Bataille's Aztec sacrifices.
Through lengthy analyses of the historical failures of social scientific and political movements predicated upon the outmoded productivist paradigm and a genealogical examination of death as a form of social relation in western societies that recalls Hertz in its essentials, Baudrillard offered a radical thesis regarding the dilemmas faced by contemporary western capitalist societies and the possible means of responding to them. As a result of our entry into a modern period characterized by the total victory of productivism, we have removed Renegade Durkheimianism much of the world from our cycle of exchange, i.e., we have expelled some actors (most importantly, the dead) from our circle of social relations, and we thus now experience a frustrated and anxiety-ridden state of existence as a result of the destruction of the more complete system of exchange characteristic of many primitive societies wherein all excess, symbolic and material, is consumed in festival or ritual sacrifice rather than being accumulated.
In short, Baudrillard pointed to the potlatch and to the experience of the left sacred examined by with violent death, especially in auto accidents, which partakes of some of the same symbolic significance as is experienced in ritual sacrifice; the obscure work on anagrammatic poetry by Ferdinand de Saussure, which is, per Baudrillard, an attempt to work through a poetics in which, as in potlatch, all excess is destroyed rather than accumulated for further deciphering or signification; 15 and political terrorism, which, in so far as it consists of a "radical denial of negotiation" (Baudrillard 1993: 37) constitutes a turning of the principle of domination, which is normally the State's unique power to refuse the counter-gift and thereby to deny the recipient's opportunity for symbolic return, back against the State itself, a move that holds out the possibility for the collapse of the State.
Baudrillard gave more nuance to his contemporary theory of the left sacred with his concept of seduction. Paralleling the move to "liberate" sex with the move to "liberate" labor, he opposed the productivist paradigm again by positing a radical form of exchange (seduction) that "takes the form of an uninterrupted ritual exchange where seducer and seduced constantly raise the stakes in a game that never ends" (Baudrillard 1990: 22) . Seduction is dangerous and Renegade Durkheimianism violent. It refuses the banality of bodies and the orgasm for the play of secrets and challenges.
Baudrillard reappropriated Huizinga's (1950) notion of play as a fundamental mode of interaction and combined it with his interpretation of the sacred as foundational mode of experience of the social. What emerges is at bottom agonistic and outside (and transgressive) of reason and law. The points of comparison with Mauss's notion of gift-giving and potlatch are obvious. Baudrillard (1990: 33) argues for a mode of social relations predicated not upon any foundational rational, wealth-maximizing agents but rather upon ludic wearers of "symbolic veils," which is more fundamental than any form of exchange based upon the centrality of production. The choice of specific terminology and examples here (e.g., his analyses of courtship play and pornography, the latter of which is in his view not seductive) is often provocatively weighted toward the language of gender and sex, but it is clear that he intended his analysis to apply to social relations generally and not merely to relations of sexual pursuit or attraction. It is thus, notwithstanding Baudrillard's extended polemic against the "social," a general social theory with strong ties to a neo-Durkheimian form of engagement with the impure sacred that is advanced here and that is at the heart of his work.
This interest in the impure sacred and the transgressive cultural and political perspective it enabled has thus survived the demise of the Durkheimian school that gave it birth and relocated itself in a number of subsequent theoretical projects including those of several of the most significant post-structuralist thinkers. A number of interesting points suggest themselves in the way of a conclusion. First, the significant turn in many theoretical circles to the body in recent years has arguably been enabled by this concentration on the impure sacred. A second telling point here has to do with the expansion in the application of the concept of the sacred inherent in a focus on the impure sacred. In Durkheim's analysis, it seems taken for granted that a certain secularization of the sacred is inevitable, even if some core function provided by the sacred must be preserved for the social body. He speaks, in other words, as a representative of the modern secular intellectual class, convinced that the "primitive"
varieties of the sacred are on their way out but still troubled (in a way, we should be sure to recognize, that many of Durkheim's more anti-clerical colleagues certainly were not) by his realization that the social fabric depends on the sacred glue for its coherence. As such, the political program that emerges from his emphasis on the pure sacred rather overemphasizes the abstract, disembodied aspects of the sacred. Insofar as his project is motivated by his own personal need for a solution to the problem of the sacred, the solution proffered is geared to a society of essentially secularized intellectuals like himself. The focus on the impure sacred also betrays a personal, existential interest in the sacred, which inevitably has political consequences, 
